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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

The Table of Contents is designed to key the reader to
those specific areas of procedure which may be of importance
to him. The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically
treated in the cases are listed under their respective titles.
ARTICLE 2-

LIMITATIONS

OF

TIME

CPLR 203(c): Applies to tort counterclaim in a contract action.
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Atlas Oil Co.,' decided pursuant to the
CPA, the appellate division, fourth department, recently ruled that
in a suit for breach of contract the defendant could not interpose
a tort counterclaim after the statute of limitations for tort had
run. The court noted that, since the alleged act occurred in 1959
and the three year statute of limitations 2 had run prior to the
effective date of the CPLR, the ameliorative provisions of the
CPLR were not available to the defendant. From this language,
it may be presumed that had the case been decided under the
CPLR a different result would have been reached.
CPLR 203(c) states that "[i]f the . . . counterclaim arose
from the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or
occurrences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint depends,
it is not barred to the extent of the demand in the complaint notwithstanding that it was barred at the time the claims asserted in
the complaint were interposed." This section, while based on CPA
§§ 11 and 61, greatly changes the statutory law in New York.3
Under CPA § 11, the statute of limitations on a defendant's
counterclaim was not tolled until the answer containing the counterclaim was served.4 The CPLR adopts the rule of Parsell v.
Essex G that the statute
of limitations is tolled when the plaintiff
6
serves the summons.
CPA § 61 provided that a cause of action barred by the statute
of limitations could not be interposed as a defense or counterclaim.
CPA § 11 further provided a similar limitation as concerning the
interposition of a claim for relief.
CPLR 203(c) adopts, essentially, the doctrine of "equitable
recoupment." Under this doctrine, a counterclaim barred by the
statute of limitations can nevertheless be interposed, but only to the
128 App. Div. 2d 644, 280 N.Y.S2d 731 (4th Dep't 1967).
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extent that it abates the plaintiff's demand. 7 However, unlike prior
expressions of the equitable recoupment doctrine in New York,8
the CPLR does not require the counterclaim or defense to be based
on the same theory as the complaint. 9 Instead, the defense or
counterclaim need only stem from the "transactions, occurrences,
or series of transactions or occurrences . . ." out of which the
complaint arises. 10 Thus, where a claim in a complaint is based
on contract, a counterclaim in tort arising from the same transactions, as in the Chevron case, should be allowed to be interposed
to the extent that it abates a plaintiff's claim, regardless of the fact
that it would be barred as an independent cause of action by the
statute of limitations.
CPLR 205(a):

Prior dismissal for failure to serve timely complaint not a bar to extension.

CPLR 205(a), a saving statute, allows a plaintiff to commence
a new action on the same cause within six months after the cessation of the original action even though the statute of limitations
would have since run,:" provided the original action is not terminated, 12 inter alia, by a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute.'" One issue which has repeatedly confronted the courts both
under the CPA and the CPLR is whether a dismissal for failure
to serve a timely complaint' 4 constitutes a dismissal for failure to
prosecute. 15
In the recent case of Virgilio v. Ketchum,"0 the court was
faced with the issue of whether plaintiffs should be allowed to
commence, for a second time, two actions after they were dismissed
initially pursuant to CPLR 3012(b), without prejudice, for failure
to serve timely complaints. The causes of action arose on November 6, 1966 and were dismissed on April 24, 1967. The new
7
See Tite Guar. & Trust Co. v. Hicks, 283 App. Div. 723, 127
N.Y.S.2d 340 (2d Dep't 1954).
8 See Fish v. Conley, 221 App. Div. 609, 225 N.Y.S. 27 (3d Dep't

1927).9

For a complete discussion of the equitable recoupment doctrine under
the CPLR, see generally 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
PRACTICE
203.25 (1963).
10 CPLR 203(c).
:"This section is based upon CPA § 23; the only change is a reduction
of the saving period from one year to six months.
12 The word terminated includes a judgment reversed on appeal without
awarding a new trial. SECOND REP. 52.
'3 Additionally, CPLR 205 is inapplicable where the action is terminated
by a voluntary discontinuance or a final judgment on the merits. CPLR

205 (a).
14

See CPLR 3012(b).

'5 See CPLR 3216.

1654 Misc. 2d 111, 281 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1967).

